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THOMAS CONLAN

The Nature of Warfare in Fourteenth-Century Japan: The Record of Nomoto Tomoyuki

Abstract: Although the "rise" of warriors in Japanese history has generated considerable scholarly attention, the wars that propelled these men to prominence have not received the same scrutiny. Recent scholarship has revealed, however, that warfare was instrumental to change rather than merely expressive of it. The outbreak of war in 1331 and destruction of the Kamakura *bakufu* in 1333 were catalysts for profound transformations in Japan; to understand the changes in state and society, we must first explore the nature of the warfare that was endemic in this period. This essay reconstructs the experience of Nomoto Tomoyuki, a fourteenth-century warrior, in order to examine the nature of warfare.

War, a plastic term describing an activity innately human and infinitely variable, denotes an event so liminal that nearly every history, chronicle, and many an epic prior to the twentieth century was devoted to expounding its constituent glories, treacheries, and tragedies. Nevertheless, after the trauma of the great world wars, attitudes regarding war underwent an epochal shift and instead of singing the praises of the brave and recording their names and deeds for posterity, the ultimate glorification became reserved for the Unknown Soldier.

Scholarship reflects the spirit of the times. With the rise of "personless" social history (i.e., Marxism and the Annales School), the focus of historical inquiry becomes directed to either abstractions—shifts in the composition of class and the corresponding transformations in society engendered by the dialectic of these vertical conflicts—or long-term processes, such as demographic fluctuations or technological innovations.[1] Viewed from such para-

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[1] Events are, in contrast, merely characterized as "crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs." Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), Vol. 1, p. 21.

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digms, warfare became the preserve of military historians, concerned with the study of weapons and tactics, and popularizers, who continued the epic tradition in its modern incarnations of historical fiction. To others, war was simply dismissed as being "only a surface phenomenon."[2]

Recently, scholars have begun to rehabilitate warfare as a focal point of historical inquiry. George Duby, in *The Legend of Bouvines,* has examined the lasting repercussions of battle, although he has also emphasized the intractable epistemological difficulties in reconstructing the experience of war. John Keegan has attempted to recreate the nature of battle in *The Face of Battle,* while Charles Tilly has argued that the requisites of maintaining and supplying armies proved to be the catalyst for state formation.[3] Nevertheless, the nature of war in premodern Japan has remained unexplored until recently.[4]

Although the "rise" of warriors has generated considerable scholarly attention in Japanese history, the wars that propelled these men to prominence have languished in relative obscurity. Such a lacuna is puzzling, for the periods in which the "rise" of warriors is thought to have occurred invariably coincide with the outbreak of war. Historians have long thought that Japan's so-called "ancient" or "classical" age shifted into the "medieval" era when warriors achieved political prominence during the wars of the 1180s. Many monographs have accordingly devoted considerable attention to warriors in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[5] Recently, some scholars have argued, however, that the court was not overwhelmed in 1185 and that regional warriors were more closely tied to the capital than had been previously realized. The new political entity that was created in the aftermath of the 1180s—the Kamakura regime—supplemented the court instead of supplanting it. Instead of the founding of the Kamakura *bakufu,* it

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2. Mary Elizabeth Berry, *The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 27.

3. Georges Duby, *The Legend of Bouvines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

4. Some recent studies about ways of war in medieval Japan include Karl Friday, "Valorous Butchers," *Japan Forum,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (April 1993), pp. 1–21; Paul Varley, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994); and Berry, *The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto.*

5. See, for example, Karl Friday, *Hired Swords* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); William Wayne Farris, *Heavenly Warriors* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Eiko Ikegami, *The Taming of the Samurai* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Jeffrey Mass, "The Emergence of the Kamakura Bakufu," in John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass, eds., *Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 127–56, and "The Missing Minamoto in the Twelfth-Century Kanto," *Journal of Japanese Studies,* Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 121–46.

was its violent destruction in 1333 that ushered in a new social and political order.[6] While focusing on the process of change, these scholars have largely ignored the relationship between these innovations and the act of war. Warfare was instrumental to change rather than being merely expressive of it, and its waging necessitated profound transformations in state and society. In order to understand the "newness" of the fourteenth century one must first reconstruct the wars that consumed and defined the age.

An unparalleled body of source materials survives pertaining to fourteenth-century Japanese warfare, which is indicative of its contemporary importance. Not only do a number of detailed and informative chronicles exist, but nearly 1,500 records in two documentary forms, the reports of arrival (*chakutōjō*) and the petition for military rewards (*gunchūjō*) survive.[7] Most date from 1331–92, a period of fluid political authority, although they first appeared late in the thirteenth century and continued to be written through 1615.[8] Those who submitted petitions fought for those most capable of compensating their service in battle.[9]

Although these petitions have recently generated historical interest, studies have tended to concentrate on their creation and transmission;[10] their content remains relatively unexplored. To date, only Shakadō Mitsuhiro has analyzed the nature of wounds recorded in battle reports (*kassen chūmon*), but his work is problematic for several reasons.[11] He only relies upon battle reports and ignores the more common petitions for reward. Further, he divides warriors into categories such as "warriors" and "*wakatō* . . . and retainers" and assumes that these men invariably fought differently, when, in fact, both warriors (*tozama*) and retainers (*wakatō* or *miuchi*) fought on foot and on horseback.[12] Finally, Shakadō presents his data synchronically and seems oblivious to the possibility of change through time. Instead of merely using the quantifiable data found in these petitions to comprehend the nature of war, one can reconstruct the fleeting order of battle through a "braided narrative," whereby personal experiences are supplemented with sources that establish a broader context.[13] An individual's account concurrently provides the framework for a more holistic analysis that reveals, in the process, the violent order of fourteenth-century war.

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[6] See Jeffrey Mass, "Of Hierarchy and Authority at the End of Kamakura," in Jeffrey Mass, ed., *The Origins of Japan's Medieval World: Courtiers, Clerics, Warriors, and Peasants in the Fourteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 17–38. This view is shared by Amino Yoshihiko, who sees in the fourteenth century a groundswell of change in which the very structure of society was transformed. For his initial exposition of this thesis, see Amino Yoshihiko, *Mōko shūrai,* Vol. 10 of *Nihon no rekishi* (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1974).

[7] Reports of arrival attest that a warrior had arrived at a particular encampment and thereby reveal how troops assembled. These documents do not conform to a single pattern. Some were composed immediately after arriving at a staging point, or fighting in battle, while others were written weeks or months after the events they describe. For an illuminating article, see Urushihara Tōru, "Chakutōjō no kisoteki kōsatsu," *Shigaku zasshi,* Vol. 54, No. 2–3 (March 1985), pp. 65–82, particularly p. 72. By contrast, petitions for reward were submitted either after a skirmish or upon completing a campaign. These documents record the location and date of the conflict, along with any damages or notable deeds that occurred, and were submitted to military commanders.

[8] For a yearly breakdown of the number of these documents in the fourteenth century, see Thomas Conlan, "State of War: The Violent Order of Fourteenth Century Japan" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1998), pp. 57–86, 250–52, and "Nanbokuchōki kassen no ichikōsatsu," in Ōyama-sensei Taikan Kinen Ronshūkai, ed., *Nihon shakai no shiteki kōzō kodai chūsei* (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1997). By contrast, I have discovered fewer than 60 petitions dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Readers are referred to my dissertation for greater detail on this and many other subjects in this article.

[9] Little if any stigma accrued to those who chose to fight for competing political entities, which explains why warriors carefully preserved documents addressed to the commanders of opposing polities in the fourteenth century. The topic of petitions and autonomy is addressed in more detail in Thomas Conlan, "Largess and the Limits of Loyalty in the Fourteenth Century," in Mass, ed., *The Origins of Japan's Medieval World,* pp. 39–64.

Among the thousands of petitions that survive, one submitted on behalf of Nomoto Tomoyuki stands out as being uniquely suited for reconstructing the experience of fourteenth-century war for several reasons.[14] The first is its length. Although most petitions chronicle only a few military encounters, this document summarizes numerous petitions and reports of arrival written from 1335 through 1337 and is thus ideally suited for illuminating the epochal onset of war.[15] The second is its reliability. This document dates from

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[10] Urushihara Tōru's "Gunchūjō ni kansuru jakkan no kōsatsu," *Komonjo kenkyū,* No. 21 (June 1983), pp. 33–52, remains the definitive study of petitions for reward. For Urushihara's fullest elaboration of this topic, see his *Chūsei gunchūjō to sono sekai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998).

[11] Battle reports consist of a detailed record of wounds. Often their information would later be summarized in a petition for reward. Hence, because of their more preliminary nature, relatively few survive.

[12] Shakadō Mitsuhiro, "Nanbokuchōki ni okeru senshō," *Nairanshi kenkyū,* Vol. 13 (August 1992), pp. 27–39. For horse-riding retainers, see Matsuoka Hisato, ed., *Nanbokuchō ibun, Chūgoku, Shikoku hen* (hereafter NBIC) (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 1987–95) (6 vols.), Vol. 1, document 654 (hereafter document numbers only). For a *tozama* fighting on foot, see Fukushima Kenshi Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Fukushima kenshi,* Vol. 7 (Fukushima: Fukushima Prefecture, 1966), Okamoto Mototomo kazō monjo, document 38.

[13] David Hackett Fischer advanced the notion of "braided narrative" in *Albion's Seed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[14] This petition is found in one scroll of documents that had originally belonged to a collateral line of the Kumagai, a prominent warrior family of western Japan. I would like to thank Kumagai Masao and Hirase Naoki for allowing me to view the Kumagai documents in the autumn of 1995. For a printed version of this document, see NBIC 654.

[15] This distinction of petitions for reward was first recognized by Urushihara in "Gunchūjō ni kansuru jakkan no kōsatsu." All of Tsurujūmaru's petition is translated as it appears in NBIC 654 except the final passages which describe events after Tomoyuki's death and are therefore summarized.

1338 and its contents can be independently verified. The third is Tomoyuki's anonymity. This petition represents a plea for rewards that largely went unheeded. By understanding how the Nomoto began their descent into obscurity, one can surmise how warfare altered the structure of state and society.

The importance of Nomoto Tomoyuki should not, however, be overestimated. His experiences, although unique, are indicative of broader trends and processes that can be gleaned from other petitions as well. Battle consists of an amalgamation of individual decisions and deeds that intertwine in the course of a single organic process. The intensely personal experience of war belies its quintessentially social nature. Victory is decided regardless of any man's valor. Nevertheless, individual acts are hardly irrelevant, for the overlapping actions, fates, and decisions of the multitude balance into a simple result of victory, defeat, or stalemate, with profound ramifications for all. Inasmuch as war can best be discerned when the voices of the many are assembled in a single narrative, let us therefore turn to the petition submitted by Nomoto Tomoyuki's son Tsurujūmaru.

> Attention
>
> Tsurujūmaru, the son of Nomoto Noto Shirō Tomoyuki, now dead, states [his father's] military service.
>
> The aforementioned Tomoyuki is a descendant of this [the Kumagai?] house. Since he started serving the shogun [Ashikaga Takauji], he has performed unparalleled military service, abandoning his lands and fighting with little concern for personal safety. There is no hiding his valor. Nevertheless, Tomoyuki was unable to submit [a complete record of] his deeds [while alive]. They are now humbly presented.

Tsurujūmaru's document begins abruptly. Political narratives were unnecessary in the 1330s because all contemporaries understood the initial context—an indeterminate period of complex political maneuvering that had collapsed into the clarity of war. Warfare erupted in 1331 as a result of conflicting attitudes regarding the parameters of authority that were focused by an imperial succession dispute. Late in the thirteenth century, the Kamakura *bakufu* had decreed that both contending candidates to the throne were to reign alternately. The emperor of one lineage would pass the throne to the crown prince of the other lineage. This arrangement led to an increased polarization in state and society over the next half-century. Gradually, nobles and warriors associated with one of two lineages of imperial contenders until all of society aligned into two massive factions. The two poles of legitimacy, the rival imperial lines, ultimately coalesced into two separate courts—the Northern (Jimyōin) and Southern (Daikakuji)—each of which vied for hegemony from 1331 until 1392.

The regime that brokered this compromise—the Kamakura *bakufu*—quite naturally became the focus of animosity on the part of both imperial factions. Ultimately, Go-Daigo, who desired to rule and pass the throne to one of his own many progeny in the Daikakuji line came to reject this compromise and sought to rebel against Kamakura in 1331. When the first report of Go-Daigo's rebellion arrived in Kamakura, the *bakufu* responded by dispatching forces to the capital.[16] Once Go-Daigo's rebellion was summarily crushed, Kōgon of the rival Jimyōin imperial lineage was installed as emperor, Go-Daigo was exiled to Oki Island, and most of his supporters were jailed, banished, or executed. Thereupon, Kamakura disbanded its army.

Prince Moriyoshi and Kusunoki Masashige, Go-Daigo partisans, continued their anti-Kamakura agitation and established forts in Yoshino, Akasaka, and Chihaya. In response, Kamakura mobilized during 1332–33 using methods closely resembling its pattern of calling up warriors to the capital for guard duty.[17] In 1332 three of the Kamakura *bakufu*'s armies advanced simultaneously along roads in Kawachi, Yamato, and Kii Provinces.[18] These forces, whose overall commander was Aso (Hōjō) Harutoki, proved capable of multipronged offensive in spite of their regional base, quickly overwhelming forts at Yoshino's Kinpusenji and nearby Akasaka before converging on Kusunoki Masashige's mountain stronghold of Chihaya. Although he inflicted casualties on Kamakura's forces, he had no hope of breaking Harutoki's siege.

Because of its partial mobilization against Kusunoki Masashige and Prince Moriyoshi in the fall of 1332, Kamakura's resources were stretched thin. Into this delicately balanced situation strode Ashikaga Takauji, who led one of the *bakufu*'s two reinforcing armies. Instead of aiding shogunal deputies (*tandai*) at Rokuhara, Takauji secured the support of Go-Daigo, newly escaped from Oki Island, and launched an attack against the hapless Rokuhara *tandai* late in the fourth month of 1333. Takauji also dispatched a number of mobilization orders (*saisokujō*) to warriors throughout Japan. Many turned against Kamakura, and both the *tandai* and the *bakufu* itself were destroyed within weeks.

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[16] Kamakura's army was composed of warriors drawn from Tōtōmi, Owari, Ise, Sanuki, Awaji, Iga, Mikawa, Iyo, Shinano, and Kai Provinces. See Takeuchi Rizō, ed., *Kamakura ibun* (hereafter KI) (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 1991–97) (51 vols.), Vol. 41, documents 32135–36 (hereafter document numbers only). For a detailed analysis of this, see Satō Shin'ichi, "Kōmyōji zanhen shokō," in *Zōtei Kamakura bakufu shugo seido no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971), pp. 255–74. Nevertheless, Mori Shigeaki asserts that the "Kōmyōji zanhen" merely represents Kamakura's plan for attack. See his *Taiheiki no gunzō* (Tokyo: Kadokawa Sensho, 1991), p. 112.

[17] Beginning in the late twelfth century, housemen (*gokenin*) recognized as such by the Kamakura *bakufu* would customarily serve guard duty (*ōban'yaku*) in the capital. When his prescribed period of service had expired, the *gokenin* would submit a document stating he had performed his duties—sometimes on behalf of all the warriors in a province. See the Migita documents of 10.7.1285 for three months of service guarding the retired emperor and 7.2.1301 for six months of service. Both documents are most conveniently found in the "Migita keizu," in Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, comp., *Zoku gunsho ruijū, keizubu* (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1975), pp. 145–46. Compare this with Kamakura's documents, found in KI 31911 (for a document addressed to the Suda), 31915 (the Kumagai), 32003 (Tōdaiji), 31933 (Hineno), and with Oyama ke monjo, document 13, Kantō migyōsho utsushi, in Amino Yoshihiko, *Nihon chūsei shiryō no kadai* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1996), p. 300. One other mobilization order from the Rokuhara *tandai,* addressed to Katsuoji, appears in KI 32052.

[18] "Kusunoki kassen chūmon," in Zoku Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, comp., *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū,* Vol. 3: *Shidenbu* (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1969–70), p. 548. *Gokenin* on guard duty in the capital were also expected to serve in the Kii and Yamato armies. See KI 31915.

Due to the nature of his rebellion against the established order, Takauji had to rely upon personal requests to warriors throughout Japan to join his (and Go-Daigo's) cause. Political exigency undermined the previous system of regional, province-wide mobilization; instead, warriors were enticed to fight with promises of compensation.

Even though the Kamakura *bakufu* had been obliterated, Aso Harutoki managed to keep his army intact by unilaterally granting estates to his followers as reward for their service.[19] Harutoki's still-formidable force abandoned its siege of Chihaya and perambulated to Nara, where an uneasy standoff ensued in the sixth month of 1333. The end of Harutoki's army reveals much about how strong the principle of adequate compensation for warriors had become. Harutoki's Utsunomiya allies bolted after they received an imperial edict (*rinji*) from Go-Daigo, promising that their lands would be confirmed. Others followed, save for those too tainted by their ties to Kamakura to ever countenance rewards from Go-Daigo.[20]

What is most remarkable is not that Harutoki's army crumbled under the enticement of imperial edicts, but that it survived for as long as it did. In spite of the overwhelming defeat of Kamakura and the annihilation of every other component of the regime, this expeditionary force remained. No other army would weather defeat so well. In organization and staying power (if not success), Harutoki's army was the greatest army of the fourteenth century. And yet organization per se was no longer crucial for military success. Instead, as even Harutoki had realized, generals had to compensate their troops in order to sustain their armies. After 1333, military service had to be requested instead of demanded. Armies became nothing but aggregate assemblages of individuals. With the fall of Kamakura there perished the belief that political entities deserved unquestioning loyalty, for all now knew that political regimes were inherently fragile.

The need to mobilize and wield military force became both a means of stabilizing authority and an end unto itself. After the downfall of Harutoki, no one knew who would ultimately prove to be the most successful in amassing and sustaining these powers of coercion. Sometime in the spring of 1333, state and society were unleashed from their old moorings and cast adrift in a sea of uncertainties. Ultimately, only the relentless logic of war remained: the sole unsettling certainty in an age of profound contention.

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[19] KI 32220.

[20] *Taiheiki* (*Jingū chōkōkan hon*) (hereafter *Taiheiki*) (Osaka: Izumi Shoin, 1994), *maki* 11, "Kongōsan no yosetera chūseraruru koto," pp. 304–5. This passage also appears in Helen Craig McCullough, trans., *The Taiheiki: A Chronicle of Medieval Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 334.

The turmoil that accompanied the sudden annihilation of the Kamakura *bakufu* in 1333 continued to flicker in spite of, or perhaps because of, the emperor Go-Daigo's determined efforts to forge a centralized regime. Several uprisings sputtered throughout the archipelago, but it was a group of Hōjō partisans, the beleaguered survivors of the Kamakura *bakufu,* who experienced shocking success in the summer of 1335. From their hideaway in the mountains of central Japan, they swept down and occupied the burnt-out shell of Kamakura.[21] Paralysis gripped Go-Daigo's regime until Ashikaga Takauji departed without authorization "for the sake of the realm" and crushed the Hōjō in a series of battles, occupying Kamakura in the eighth month of 1335.[22]

After Takauji had ousted the Hōjō, he waited in Kamakura for news from the capital. Tense negotiations continued between Kyoto and Kamakura as Go-Daigo and his ministers vacillated whether to reward Takauji for his achievements or punish him for his insubordination. During these four months, an uneasy calm settled on the town. Warriors preoccupied themselves in a variety of ways. Some preferred gambling while others "wrote stanzas of linked verse . . . or whiled away the time playing games (*igo*) . . . during the day and judging teas and the merits of poems at night." [23] Others lost themselves in the arms of prostitutes.[24] Their less boisterous companions listened to the yarns of famed poets and skilled minstrels.[25] Lute (*biwa*) players who recited the epic *Tale of the Heike,* with its idealized portraits of men such as Kumagai Naozane and its underlying theme of evanescent glory, proved to be particularly popular.[26]

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[21] Hōjō Tokiyuki, one of the few ranking survivors of Kamakura, fled to the mountainous province of Shinano and raised the flag of rebellion in the third month of 1335. Shinano Shiryō Kankokai, comp., *Shinano shiryō,* Vol. 5 (Nagano: Nagano Prefecture, 1954), p. 260, and, for increasing military activity in the fifth month of 1335, pp. 262–64. The Shinano uprising gained strength and, during the seventh month, Tokiyuki and his supporters swept down and sacked their old stronghold of Kamakura. Ibid., pp. 264–66.

[22] Takauji's justification appears in a pro-Ashikaga work: Yashiro Kazuo and Kami Hiroshi, eds., *Baishōron* (Tokyo: Gendai Shichōsha, 1975), p. 70. For documentary references to Takauji's expedition, including his 8.2.1335 departure without permission, see Shizuoka Kenshi, Iinkai Kenshi Hensan-shitsu, comp., *Shizuoka kenshi shiryōhen,* Vol. 6 (*Chūsei,* No. 2) (Shizuoka: Shizuoka Prefecture, 1994), document 120, and Seno Seiichirō, ed., *Nanbokuchō ibun, Kyūshū hen* (hereafter NBIK) (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 1980–92), Vol. 1, document 544 (hereafter document numbers only).

[23] *Taiheiki, maki* 7, "Chihayajō ikusa no koto," p. 167, and McCullough, trans., *The Taiheiki,* pp.184–85, contain references to gambling, prostitution, and poetry competitions. For artifacts related to gambling uncovered in Kamakura, see Amino Yoshihiko, ed., *Yomigaeru chūsei,* Vol. 3: *Bushi no miyako Kamakura* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1989), pp. 224–25.

[24] *Taiheiki, maki* 38, "Tsukushi tandai gekō no koto," pp. 1134–35.

[25] Shinano Shiryō Kankōkai, ed., *Shinano shiryō,* Vol. 7 (Nagano: Nagano Prefecture, 1956), p. 367.

The waning months of 1335 melted into a flurry of frantic action. Go-Daigo, alarmed by Takauji's flouting of authority, ultimately dispatched an army to chastise him. Both Go-Daigo and Takauji attempted to garner as much support as they could, and each issued numerous mobilization orders to warriors across the land. At some point that fall, Tomoyuki threw in his lot with Takauji. How long it took him to mobilize is unknown, although some warriors reported to camp a mere 11 days after they received their first invitation to fight.[27]

The advancing imperial army mauled Takauji's vanguard, commanded by his brother Tadayoshi. Takauji strove to avert disaster and save his brother when he set out from Kamakura with a small band of men.

> On the eighth day of the twelfth month of 1335, when the shogun [Ashikaga Takauji] set forth from Kamakura, Tomoyuki was with him. On the eleventh of the same month, at the Battle of Aizawahara in Izu, [Tomoyuki] galloped to the fore and performed the service of fighting in the vanguard. The particulars were witnessed by Uesugi Hyōgo Nyūdō and the administrator [*samurai dokoro*], Miura Inaba-no-kami.

This passage, and each subsequent one, represents Tsurujūmaru's summary of a no-longer extant petition that had been originally submitted by his father. Tomoyuki's laconic account of the battle at Aizawahara was drawn from a document written during the twelfth month of 1335. Both of Tomoyuki's witnesses, Takauji's uncle Uesugi Hyōgo Nyūdō and Miura Inaba-no-kami, perished a month later in the capital when things began to go badly for the Ashikaga.[28]

Although Tomoyuki does not mention how he felt the night before his first battle, some of his compatriots turned their thoughts to posterity. A few wrote wills, either shortly after "being called up by the military [*buke*]" or the night before battle, when fears that "something might happen" were strongest.[29] Soma Mitsutane, for example, remained preoccupied with familial concerns right to the very end, passing his documents to an adopted son four days before dying when his castle was stormed.[30] Motegi Kenan was, in contrast, more concerned with the repose of his soul. He demanded that the eighteenth of each month be treated as the day of his death and requested that the sutra he had been copying be completed as soon as possible.[31]

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[26] Kaji Hiroe, ed., *Gen'ishū* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1996), p. 271. For reference to Kō no Moronao also listening to *The Tale of the Heike* while ill, see *Taiheiki, maki* 21, "Enya hangan zanshi no koto," p. 664.

[27] NBIK 810.

[28] Uesugi Norifusa, the older brother of Takauji's mother, Uesugi Seishi, died at the "battle on the riverside." For description of his death, see Imagawa Ryōshun, "Nantaiheiki," *Gunsho ruijū 17 kassen bu 2 buke bu 1* (Tokyo: Naigai Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1930), p. 309. The Miura were disgruntled because they believed they had been snubbed by Go-Daigo's regime. See Yamada Kuniaki, "Miura-shi to Kamakura fu," in Ishii Susumu, ed., *Chūsei no hō to seiji* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992), pp. 22–51. Both Uesugi Norifusa and Miura Inaba-no-kami perished on 1.27.1336, near the Kamo River in Kyoto. See Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron,* p. 89.

The night immediately before battle was one of anticipation and trepidation. Few warriors mustered much élan. Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki wrote to his wife and told her that "battle is imminent and I feel so alone." [32] Anxious young warriors asked for combat advice from veterans.[33] Some attempted to purify themselves prior to battle, abstaining from sex or avoiding deer meat. Few resisted fortifying their resolve with generous amounts of *sake*.[34]

The only thing that Tomoyuki accomplished in this first encounter was to have been seen. That men such as the Miura and Uesugi could speak of his valor was important, for the higher the social rank of the witness, the greater the likelihood of gaining rewards.[35] For example, Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki comforted his son in a letter from the front, writing: "do not worry . . . for even if I die, the general [*taishō*] and members of the unit [*ikki*]" will ensure that rewards will be granted.[36] All in all, this first day was a good one for Tomoyuki: he received recognition and credit for the military service of his retainers, who fought at nearby Nakayama.

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[29] For the former, see Hiraoka Shishi Iinkai, ed., *Hiraoka shishi shiryōhen,* Vol. 1 (Hiraoka: Hiraoka City, 1966), 2.4.1332 Fujiwara Yasumasa yuzurijō utsushi, pp. 408–10. For the latter, see KI 32042, 32056, and the "Hakata nikki" for a will written the same day that the Kikuchi attacked Hakata.

[30] For Mitsutane's testament, see Toyoda Takeshi and Tashiro Osamu, eds., *Soma monjo* (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1979), document 34, 5.20.1336 Soma Mitsutane Yuzurijō, pp. 29–30; for reference to his death, see ibid., the Soma Okada genealogy (*keifu*), p. 205.

[31] Tochigi Kenshiryō Hensan Iinkai, *Tochigi kenshi shiryō chūsei,* Vol. 2 (Tochigi: Tochigi Prefecture, 1975), Motegi monjo document 2, Motegi ke shōmon utsushi, pp. 72–73.

[32] Hino Shishi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Hino shishi shiryōshū, Takahata Fudō tainai monjo hen* (Tokyo: Tōkyō Inshokan, 1993), document 36, Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki shojō.

[33] "Aro monogatari," in Ichiko Teiji et al., eds., *Muromachi monogatari shū,* Vol. 1 in the series *Shin Nihon koten bungaku taikei* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), pp. 128–33. See also Furutani Tomochika et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki* (Tokyo: Kokumin Bunko Kankōkai, 1991), *maki* 37, p. 909. Although this text is more commonly known as *Genpei seisuiki,* the consensus of Japanese literary scholars is that *Genpei jōsuiki* is the correct pronunciation.

[34] Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, comp., *Zoku gunsho ruijū, bukebu,* Vol. 25, Part 1 (Tokyo: Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1975), p. 79. The *Taiheiki* roundly criticizes a general for having prostitutes in his camp and claims that their (defiling?) presence contributed to his defeat. *Taiheiki, maki* 38, "Tsukushi tandai gekō no koto," pp. 1134–35. For the defiling nature of deer meat, see Furutani et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki, maki* 36, p. 899. For *sake,* see "Aro monogatari," p. 131. For drinking *sake* in order to ensure an enemy's defeat, see Ishioka Hisao, ed., *Heihō ryōzuisho* (Tokyo: Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1967), p. 59.

[35] As one warrior stated, "my uncle Yasaburō Kunihiro died in battle right under the eyes of the general [*taishō*]; there was no need for any other witnesses." Dai Nihon Shiryō Hensanshitsu, comp., *Dai Nihon shiryō* (hereafter DNSR) (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1901–) (43 volumes), Series 6, Vol. 14, 12.1350 Ohara kosaji gunchūjō, pp. 58–59.

> On the same day, the battle of Nakayama [erupted]. The enemy was strong to the fore so [Tomoyuki's men] retreated a bit. Tomoyuki's retainers [*wakatō*] Iwase Hikotarō Nobutsune, Matagorō Mitsuie, Matatarō Tanetsune, and Magogorō Ietsuna, some ten horsemen in all, charged into the forces of Officer [*hangan*] Yūki and cut down one enemy rider. [Nobutsune et al.] were about to take the head, but the general of the day, Yamana Izu-no-kami (Tokiuji), witnessed his deeds and penned a document of praise [*kanjō*]. Following this order [not to take the head, Nobutsune, Mitsuie, Tanetsune, and Ietsuna] pursued the fleeing enemy to the Hire River. The particulars appear on the document of arrival [*chakutōjō*] dated the following day.

The battles of Aizawahara and Nakagawa were fought on this same day and in close proximity. Although some battles ended in a few hours, thereby making it possible to fight twice on a given day, Tomoyuki does not mention fighting at Nakagawa.[37] Either he rested or he fought separately from his retainers. Nevertheless, Tomoyuki received credit for the deeds of the Iwase. Although the latter might have fought separately, they would not have submitted their own petitions for reward. In this sense, the right to submit documents, and not the ability to ride into battle on horseback, proved to be the ultimate sign of status.

The encounter just described was not necessarily typical. Desultory battles could last for days, while sieges could last for months.[38] Commanders often relied upon blockades to strangle their enemies, but the fluid political situation and the ill-defined parameters of political and military allegiance in 1335 contributed to the rapid and decisive outcome in this instance.

When standing armies were about to clash, they exchanged "war cries" (*toki*) which demarcated the advent of battle along with the eerie, unnerving, husky whistle of specially designed "humming arrows" (*kaburaya*).[39] The war cry constituted an invitation to fight.[40] According to Ise Sadatake, a general would twice call out: "Ei, Ei." His troops would reply "Oh."[41] Once the defeated fled, triumphant warriors yelled "battle cries of victory," which concluded the proceedings.[42]

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[36] Hino Shishi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Hino shishi shiryōshū Takahata Fudō tainai monjo hen,* document 45, Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki shojō.

[37] In another example, we see that Hiromine Seishun fought two battles on the same day—first in Toba, in the southern part of the capital, and later on the Amida peak of Mt. Hiei. Hyōgo Kenshi Henshū Senmon Iinkai, comp., *Hyōgo kenshi chūsei shiryōhen,* Vol. 2 (Hyogo: Hyogo Prefecture, 1987), Hiromine monjo document 28, 9.26.1336 Hiromine Seishun gunchūjō an, p. 616. For a battle that lasted approximately five hours, see NBIK 1154.

[38] "Hakata nikki," in Zoku Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, comp., *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū,* Vol. 3, *Shidenbu,* p. 556. "A battle [raged] every day for five days which consisted of nothing but an arrow battle. Sword blows were not exchanged [but] a number of enemy were shot [*ya ikusa bakari nite tachi uchi nashi*]." For battles lasting six consecutive days, see NBIK 2536. Some warriors fought a series of battles for a little over one month. NBIK 657–63. Others guarded areas and fought indeterminate battles for seven months while besieging a castle. NBIK 794–95, 810.

Only a small number of men fought at Nakagawa. Even ten horsemen might slice through the dispersed armies of the fourteenth century, in which scattered groups of foot soldiers intermingled with small clusters of enemy horsemen. Although one might imagine that Tomoyuki and his men galloped on speedy horses, the reality was far more prosaic. Japanese horses of the Kamakura period were quite small—equivalent in size to the modern pony. The average horse stood only slightly over four feet at the shoulder (130 cm), while the smallest horses were only three and a half feet tall (109 cm) and the largest four feet seven inches (140 cm)![43] These short-legged but sturdy beasts were capable of enduring much punishment over rough terrain, but they were not particularly fast. Japanese horses wore straw sandals instead of iron shoes.[44] When burdened with armor and an armored rider, these horses could only muster a gallop after considerable effort and could not sustain such a pace before dropping into a trot.[45] When attempting to reconstruct battle scenes, we must take the smallness and slowness of Japanese horses into consideration.

In the above account from Tsurujūmaru's petition, the Iwase cut down

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39. Numerous examples appear in the *Taiheiki.* See, for example, *maki* 26, "Shijō nawate kassen no koto," p. 779; *maki* 31, "Musashino kassen no koto," p. 921 for a "battle cry of victory"; *maki* 33, "Kikuchi Shōni kassen no koto," p. 994; *maki* 38, "Settsu no kuni kassen no koto," p. 1146; *maki* 39, "Motouji, Haga kassen no koto," p. 1162 for "three battle cries." For a reference to both armies emitting three battle cries, see Iwahashi Kotaya, *Entairyaku,* Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Taiyōsha, 1940), 6.9.1353, p. 307.

40. Shimada Isao, ed., *Teijō zakki,* Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1985), p. 319.

41. Ibid. Prior to battle, or so the manuals say, warriors were to start their calls pianissimo and then crescendo; after victory had been achieved, the war cries were to start off forte and decrescendo. "This would lead to a hundred victories in a hundred battles." "Aro monogatari," p. 132. For more on these military manuals, see Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, comp., *Zoku gunsho ruijū, bukebu,* Vol. 25, Part 1, p. 79.

42. *Taiheiki, maki* 33, "Kikuchi kassen no koto," p. 995.

43. This is known from horse skeletons excavated from Zaimokuza in Kamakura. See Hayashida Shigeyuki, *Nihon zairaba no keitō ni kansuru kenkyū* (Tokyo: Nihon Chūō Keibakai, 1978), pp. 109–20, and Suzuki Hisashi, *Kamakura zaimokuza hakken no chūsei iseki to sono jinkotsu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956).

44. For more on horse footwear, see Kuroda Hideo, "Uma no sandaru," *Sugata to shigusa no chūseishi* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1986), pp. 22–28. For a reference to "horse shoes" (*uma no kutsu*), see *Taiheiki, maki* 29, "Moronao kyodai yoriki shōgai no koto," p. 883.

45. Suzuki Kenji, *Rekishi e no shōtai,* Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppankai, 1980), pp. 32–34, and Kawai Yasushi, *Genpei kassen no kyozō o hagu* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1996), p. 53. For horses wearing armor, see *Taiheiki, maki* 23, "Hata Rokurō saemon ga koto," p. 685.

an enemy horseman, although it is not clear how they accomplished this feat. Much prose is expended on the issue of taking the head in fourteenth-century sources, for this act was infused with a significant amount of cultural meaning and generated praise from authorities.[46] The overriding purpose of taking a head was to "prove" one's battle service and thus the act was the metaphoric apogee of good fortune: "those who took an enemy's head . . . sallied forth from the castle; those who lost their lords retreated, crying, into the castle."[47] Heads were rigorously inspected because they constituted the most tangible proof of battle service.[48] The heads of those killed would be carefully cleaned and dressed, and names attached to those who could be identified, while those determined to be from low-ranking men would be discarded.[49] Recognition was a crucial concern: an unidentified head was "no different from taking the head of a dog or bird."[50]

Generals normally discouraged the custom of headhunting because warriors so engaged might become vulnerable. A man preoccupied with taking a head placed himself in grave danger. According to one petition, one such man was shot and killed by returning opponents.[51] Another warned his comrades that "when you try to take a head, you will invariably encounter five or ten enemy."[52] Those who were successful tended to abandon the battlefield, already in possession of the ultimate proof of valor.[53] Some commanders issued standing orders to "cut and toss" these heads.[54] In these circumstances, warriors discarded heads once their valor had been witnessed.[55] A few even contented themselves with a fragment of armor instead of a head. One warrior "cut and tossed" an enemy head and settled instead for a piece of enemy armor because he was in the midst of the enemy and lacked sufficient space to hack off the head.[56] Nevertheless, the custom of headhunting proved tenacious. Although the Iwase abandoned their quarry at Nakagawa, another of Tomoyuki's retainers managed to take one on 1.30.1336. Likewise, the same general who issued "cut and toss" orders later chose to reward two warriors equally: the first killed an enemy general while the second took his head![57]

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[46] The oldest surviving document of praise lauds the capture of a head. "During skirmishing in the mountains north of Chihaya castle, you took a head, which is most splendid." 4.21.1333 Harutoki kanjō, unpublished document, which has been transcribed in Uemura Seiji, *Kusunoki Masashige* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1962), p. 97. From 1333 onward, numerous petitions and chronicles mention decapitating enemy warriors.

[47] Furutani et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki, maki* 37, p. 917. The taking of heads was proudly mentioned in petitions for reward. See NBIC 400 and 1212.

[48] *Taiheiki, maki* 24, "Setajō ochiru no koto," p. 715. For one list of those killed in battle, see NBIK 6940. For a visual representation of a warrior presenting heads, and his deeds being recorded by a scribe, see Komatsu Shigemi, ed., *Mōko shurai ekotoba,* Vol. 13 of *Nihon no emaki* (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1988), pp. 114–15.

[49] See, for example, Furutani et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki, maki* 20, p. 489. For examples of heads being pickled in *sake,* see Shimada, ed., *Teijō zakki,* Vol. 4, pp. 229–30. For a representation of heads on display, with name tags attached, see Komatsu Shigemi, ed., *Go-sannen ekotoba,* Vol. 15 of *Nihon emaki taisei* (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1977), pp. 102–3.

[50] Furutani et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki, maki* 37, p. 926.

[51] Tochigi Kenshi Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Tochigi kenshi shiryōhen chūsei,* Vol. 3 (Tochigi: Tochigi Prefecture, 1975), pp. 346–47, Sano Awa ichiō maru gunchūjō, which states: "as he was taking [their heads?] [*uchitoru no tokoro*], the enemy returned and killed him." See also Furutani et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki, maki* 42, p. 1059, for an instance of a man being shot while trying to take a head.

[52] "Aro monogatari," p. 129.

[53] A triumphant warrior grasping a head constitutes a standard motif of the successful warrior. See *Ibaragi no emaki* (Mito: Ibaragi Kenritsu Rekishikan, 1989), color plate 2, "Shōtōku taishi emaki," and Komatsu, ed., *Go-sannen kassen ekotoba,* p. 50. For forged references to taking seven heads, see NBIC 1685.

Those thirsty for some token of achievement decapitated any wounded enemy they could find. For a wounded man to spend a night unscathed on the battlefield was described as being nothing short of "miraculous" (*fushigi nare*).[58] Prior to the fourteenth century, warriors were praised for securing as many heads as possible. For example, during the Mongol invasion of 1281, Kikuchi Jirō "advanced among the dead [Mongols], collected a large number of heads, and brought them into the castle, therefore making a name for himself [to last for] generations."[59] Although some warriors continued to matter-of-factly pick up discarded heads, a stigma gradually accrued to such scavenging.[60] According to the *Taiheiki,* some particularly overzealous warriors

> scoured the capital for those dead and wounded who had fallen in moats and ditches and collected heads of the dead, and lined them up—eight hundred and seventy three in all—at Rokujō riverbed [*kawara*]. Of those, most had not been killed in battle. Many were fakes, taken from residents [*zaikenin*],

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[54] NBIC 773. This has also been mentioned in Satō Shin'ichi, *Nanbokuchō no dōran* (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1974), p. 197. Urushihara Tōru has argued that these "cut and toss" orders represent a modification of the inspection process for rewards. In cases where detailed inspections proved impossible, eyewitness accounts became increasingly relied upon. See his *Chūsei gunchūjō to sono sekai,* particularly pp. 138–44.

[55] For examples of "cut and tossed" heads, see NBIK 674 and 1211–12; *Taiheiki, maki* 31, "Yawata ikusa no koto," p. 935; and Tamayama Narimoto, ed., *Ino Hachimangū monjo* (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1983), document 148, Iga Morimitsu gunchūjō, of 5.1337. For other examples of heads being taken, see NBIK 732 and 1238.

[56] NBIC 457.

[57] Hasegawa Tadashi, ed., *Taiheiki,* Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1996), *maki* 19, "Kokushi Ise no kuni o hete Yoshino dono e mairu koto," p. 528. Nevertheless, Tashiro Akitsune followed his injunctions and "cut and tossed" an enemy, which was witnessed by Kuge Saburō and Miyake Gorō. See Takaishi-shi Hensankai, comp., *Takaishi shishi* (Takaishi: Takaishi City, 1986), document 123, 3.26.1338 Tashiro Akitsune gunchūjō.

[58] *Taiheiki, maki* 32, "Kōnan ikusa no koto," p. 971.

[59] "Hachiman gudō kun," in Hanawa Hokinoichi, comp., *Gunsho ruijū,* Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Keizai Zasshisha, 1894), p. 468.

[60] For an example of nonchalant headhunting in the fourteenth century, see *Taiheiki, maki* 31, "Usui toge kassen no koto," p. 929.

> townsmen, and travelers on the roadside. A welter of names were haphazardly attached to the heads. Five placards stated that the designated head was of Akamatsu Enshin. As there was no one who knew how he looked, all five were hung in the same way . . . The wags of the capital gazed at the heads and murmured "Those who borrowed these heads returned them with interest." [61]

Such ridicule coincides with the origin of rules of etiquette regarding the taking of heads.[62] Transgressors of the norms of headhunting became the objects of laughter in the 1330s and the focus of scorn in the 1390s.[63] The practice of picking up an abandoned head gradually became a shameful act, and so later military manuals devoted considerable detail to distinguishing whether a head was removed from a living man or a corpse.[64]

> On the twelfth day of the same month, during the battle of Sano kawara . . . [Tomoyuki et al.] joined the main body of troops [*nakate*], crossed the river, and performed military service.
>
> On the thirteenth, during the battle at the Izu kokufu, [Tomoyuki's] follower [*chūgen*] Heigorō-otoko was killed.

Heigorō was a member of the base orders (*genin*) who followed Nomoto Tomoyuki into battle. He lacked a surname and was referred to as *otoko* (*onoko*), a disrespectful epithet reserved for those of lower orders or those deserving scorn.[65] Although one can assert with some confidence that Heigorō did not ride a horse, it is not clear whether he was a foot soldier or a laborer accidently killed in the fray. Speed was of the essence and so little time was spared to minister to the wounded or to bury the dead.

Nomoto Tomoyuki could have demanded compensation for the death of Heigorō, but Heigorō's bereaved could not. Heigorō was in all probability administered last rites and buried in a mass grave by *ji* priests,[66] who collected the corpses, buried them, performed funeral ceremonies, and set up a memorial.[67] If the dead man was a ranking warrior, *jishū* priests might erect a commemorative stele, as did Ku and Hen Amidabutsu for three Akima warriors who died defending Kamakura.[68] Heigorō was probably buried in a makeshift grave too shallow to prevent dogs from digging up and gnawing on his bones.[69] Wandering priests might write sutras or sanskrit letters on these wretched remains in order to aid the dead on their path to salvation.[70]

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[61] *Taiheiki, maki* 8, "Sangatsu jūninichi Miyako ikusa no koto," p. 195. For a different English translation, see McCullough, trans., *The Taiheiki*, p. 214.

[62] For a pioneering study of such a "civilizing process," see Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

[63] For the first criticisms of a man who "picked up heads thrown away by his colleagues," see Tomikura Tokujirō, ed., *Meitokuki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1941), *maki* 2, "Toki Michisada no koto," p. 106.

[64] Shimada, ed., *Teijō zakki*, Vol. 3, p. 318.

[65] Women used this epithet to address a rapist. See Furutani et al., eds., *Genpei jōsuiki, maki* 35, p. 882. For references to the base (*genin*) being addressed in a similar manner, see NBIC 744.

[66] Ippen (1239–89) founded a movement whose followers (*jishū*, or congegration of itinerant priests) attempted to continually chant the *nenbutsu* "Hail the Amida Bodhisattva." *Ji* priests danced while performing *nenbutsu* and traveled throughout Japan. They administered to the dying (see Tomikura, ed., *Meitokuki, maki* 2, "Ieyoshi kurō no koto," p. 89) and were also responsible for medical treatment. For a pioneering study of this, see Hattori Toshirō, "Tōdai ni okeru senshō byōsha no kyūgo to shūkyō katsudō," *Muromachi Azuchi Momoyama jidai igakushi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1971), pp. 443–52.

> On the third day of the first month of 1336, Tomoyuki's retainer Iwase Hikotarō Nobutsune led the vanguard's attack of Ikisumiya [castle] in Ōmi [Province]. As he cut his way through the castle walls of the southeast corner, Nobutsune had an arrow pass through his left and right cheeks. This was seen by the general Hyōbu taiyū [Niki Yoriaki] and Yamana Izu-no-kami. Nobutsune even received a commendation [*kanjō*] [from these men]. In addition, the retainer Maruyama Hikojirō Tametoki and Katakiri Gorō Nariyoshi were wounded. The following day all arrived at Noji station.

Takauji's army hardly paused on its advance to the capital and arrived near the outskirts after two and a half weeks. Speed was essential in such circumstances, for the longer an army remained on the road, the greater the burden for its warriors and, ultimately, the less likely its success in battle. Ashikaga Takauji mastered the quick march, covering the distance between Kyoto and Kamakura in a mere 17 days.[71] Other warriors, covering a similar distance, might require as long as 25 days,[72] while a beleaguered army required over two months.[73]

The fleeing imperial forces regrouped just to the west of the capital at Ikusu "castle," but only managed to hold up Takauji's army for a day. The battle was in all probability waged near the castle's outlying structures, which were captured through either frontal assault or arson.[74] One of the few surviving pictorial representations of a mountain castle reveals little more than a series of temporary barricades.[75] Ikusu must have been such a humble structure. By contrast, some of the most formidable castles, such as Kusu castle in northern Kyushu, could withstand sieges for almost seven months.[76]

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[67] Ōtōnomiya monogatari," in Shinano Shiryō Kankōkai, comp., *Shinano shiryō,* Vol. 7, p. 393. For a reference to 20 or 30 priests collecting corpses after a battle in 1336, see also *Taiheiki, maki* 15, "Shōgun miyako o ochiru koto," p. 444.

[68] KI 32175. The purpose of these markers was to ensure that the souls of those killed violently would be reborn in the Pure Land.

[69] See Suzuki, *Kamakura zaimokuza hakken no chūsei iseki to sono jinkotsu,* particularly pp. 22–24.

[70] See ibid., pp. 28–29. The act of writing on the skulls of the dead is also mentioned in the twelfth-century literary masterpiece, *Hōjōki.*

[71] Shizuoka Kenshi, Iinkai Kenshi Hensan-shitsu, comp., *Shizuoka kenshi shiryōhen,* Vol. 6 (*Chūsei,* No. 2), document 81, Ashikaga Takauji Kantō gekō shukunami kassen chūmon, pp. 33–35.

[72] Saitama-ken Shiryō Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Shinpen Saitama kenshi, shiryōhen,* Vol. 5 (*Chūsei,* No. 1) (Saitama: Saitama Prefecture, 1982), document 316, 2.11.1338 Beppu Yukisane chakutōjō, p. 246.

[73] Ibid., document 318, 3.1338 Kudama Yukiyasu gunchūjō, pp. 246–47.

[74] For attacks, see NBIC 498, NBIK 657–58, 662–63, 925–26, and 794–96. For burning barricades, see NBIK 658.

After an arrow pierced the face of Iwase Hikotarō Nobutsune, he was undoubtedly escorted by his companions in a manner similar to that in the *Heiji monogatari emaki,* where one man leads a wobbly warrior away from the melee. In spite of the apparent severity of his wound, Nobutsune nevertheless fought again five days later.

Nobutsune's facial wound was in fact relatively minor because the arrowhead was easily extracted. One can reconstruct what Nobutsune must have endured from an illustration in the *Go sannen ekotoba,* where we see one man restraining and steadying his wounded companion while another is using what look like pliers to extract an arrow from his face. Nobutsune was fortunate, for those who could not have an arrowhead extracted died agonizing deaths or were crippled.[77]

Many of the seriously wounded died shortly after battle because medical technology was primitive. One rescued warrior, for example, succumbed to seven sword and arrow wounds several hours after he had been wounded in battle.[78] Another, wounded in the shoulder, lingered until he reached home a week later to die.[79] One of the few surviving manuals from the fourteenth century, the *Fukuden hō,* is remarkably less sophisticated in dealing with wounds than later manuals. It is, however, replete with astute observations. The reader of this text would, in all probability, be able to judge whether a wound was mortal, although treatment was not greatly aided by this text. Nevertheless, some herbs that are mentioned, such as mugwort (*yomogi*), have medicinal value as effective coagulants.[80] Much of this knowledge seems to have been concentrated in Buddhist temples. Yūrin, the author of the *Fukuden hō,* was a noted Buddhist priest.[81] To use such a manual required a good deal of knowledge, as well as the ability to collect and permanently store materials. We can therefore assume that medical specialists existed and that their medicines, and techniques, were reserved for the most powerful warriors.[82]

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[75] See the large fold-out plates in Gotō Shigeki, ed., *Nihon koji bijutsu zenshū,* Vol. 10 (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1980) depicting one panel from the *Rokudō-e.*

[76] See NBIK 810 for mobilization orders being dispatched on 3.13.1336. Kusu castle did not fall until 10.12.1336.

[77] One man, shot just below the shoulder by an arrow, was unable to extract it, and "after three days of utter agony, died a screaming death." *Taiheiki, maki* 23, "Hata Rokurō saemon ga koto," p. 686. Beppu Michizane was crippled because of an arrowhead lodged in his foot. See the 2.1344 Beppu Michizane gunchūjō utsushi, in Saitama-ken Shiryō Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Shinpen Saitama kenshi, shiryōhen,* Vol. 5 (*Chūsei,* No. 1), pp. 264–65. Michizane ultimately perished in battle somewhere in Kii Province during the spring of 1360. See ibid., *uru* 4.9.1360 Ashikaga Yoshiakira gokan migyōsho, p. 310. I am indebted to Andrew Goble for bringing this to my attention.

[78] *Taiheiki, maki* 23, "Hata Rokurō saemon ga koto," p. 686.

[79] NBIK 1301.

[80] For more on the efficacy of *yomogi,* see the *Yūrin Fukuden hō, maki* 11, part of the Fujigawa collection located at the rare manuscripts collection at the main library (Fuzoku Toshokan) of Kyoto University. Most medications were mixed with warm *sake,* which enhanced their effect.

The state of surgical techniques for the fourteenth century is evident in the *Fukuden hō.* For abdominal wounds, one was to "cover the intestines with dried feces; then close the wound with mulberry root sutures and spread cattail pollen over the area. Activities to be avoided were anger, laughter, thought, sex, activity, work, sour foods, and *sake.*"[83] Needless to say, the odds of surviving serious wounds were slim.

> On the eighth, Tomoyuki's retainers Iwase Hikotarō Nobutsune, Matagorō, Matatarō, and Magogorō all joined Yūki [family] forces and pursued the enemy to Hachiman. On the edge of the Owatari bridge, these four charged and destroyed a tower [*yagura*] on the bridge and slashed their way onto the structure. After kicking [*fumiotoshi*] the middle bridge's girders into the river, Iwase Matatarō Tanetsune was wounded. The particulars were reported to the encampment [*jin*] of Kō Musashino-kami (Moronao) because it was located on the bridge.

On the eighth, Nomoto Tomoyuki and his retainers attacked imperial encampments at Iwashimizu, south of the capital. Several bridges crossing the Yodo River were the focal point of the battle. Archers stationed in the tower on each bridge provided covering fire for Go-Daigo's defenders against the Ashikaga onslaught. While Nomoto's men were destroying both the enemy tower and the girders of the middle bridge, other warriors allied to the Ashikaga, such as Yamanouchi Michitsugu, built their own towers and "shot long-range arrows down on six enemy horsemen below, knocking some off their horses and forcing others to flee."[84]

Warriors did not invariably serve under a single commander; instead they submitted their petitions to the nearest available commander. Although Nomoto Tomoyuki had his documents previously monogrammed by Yamana Izu-no-kami, he submitted his documents of the day to Kō no Moronao because of the latter's proximity.

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[81] According to the *Kokushi daijiten* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1979–97) in its explanation of the *Fukuden hō,* Yūrin resided at Nanzenji and founded Tōfukuji, located in Hitachi's Kashima-gun.

[82] For example, the ailing Niki Yoriaki was treated by a medical priest, Tsūsen, with acupuncture, but to no avail, for he died the next day. Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, ed., *Entairyaku,* Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1985), 10.12.1359, p. 300.

[83] *Yūrin Fukuden hō, maki* 11, p. 4.

[84] NBIC 222. Michitsugu was killed at the Kamo riverbed at Sanjō on 1.30.1336.

> On the battle of the sixteenth, Tomoyuki's retainers Nobutsune and Mitsuie galloped to the fore and drove the enemy away from Hōsshōji. [Nobutsune?] cut down one horseman wearing dyed and patterned [*kōketsu*] armor [*hitatare*].[85] The particulars were seen by Toki Hōki Zenmon (Yorisada) and Sasaki Saemon Shichirō.

At this juncture, Takauji's forces managed to occupy the capital, forcing Go-Daigo to flee to Mt. Hiei northeast of the capital. As Ashikaga reinforcements poured in from the west, the fortunes of their cause dramatically improved.

Nobutsune cut down a horseman who was identified only by his armor. The purpose of armor was for both bodily defense and recognition. Not only could its quality express the general wealth of its owner, but its coloring schema identified him as belonging to the Minamoto, Taira, Fujiwara, or Tachibana clan.[86] Owing to individualistic styles of braiding—over 18 color combinations and methods of braiding are identifiable—even men who wore armor of a similar style could be identified from afar.[87] This armor proved durable and was subject to incremental improvements in design.[88]

The man killed by Nobutsune could be distinguished as an enemy because warriors attached special badges or emblems in order to signal both their allegiances and their intention to fight. These emblems, of simple cloth, were often emblazoned with patterns and the names of deities.[89] Those who agreed on a common badge created a fighting unit (*tō*) of the moment.[90] Conversely, those who sought to change their allegiance or to sneak into an enemy camp simply exchanged badges,[91] while those who resolved to remain aloof wore no flags or emblems.[92]

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[85] For an illustration of *kōketsu,* see *Yosoku kojitsu daijiten* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1995), pp. 208, 222 (an illustration), and 434.

[86] Of course, this color schema was not rigorously enforced, but it still provided a general guideline for identifying the family background of its wearer. The Genji wore black, the Heishi purple, the Fujiwara light green, and the Tachibana yellow. See "Heishō jinjun yōryaku shō," in Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, comp., *Zoku gunsho ruijū, bukebu,* Vol. 25, Part 1, p. 94.

[87] Torugashi Yuzuru, ed., *Kassen emaki—bushi no sekai* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1990), pp. 21–23.

[88] For example, Kikuchi Takemitsu tested the strength of each plate (*sane*) and constructed a particularly effective suit of armor which "stopped the arrows of even the strongest archers." *Taiheiki, maki* 33, "Kikuchi kassen no koto," p. 996.

[89] The sole surviving emblem is located in the Oyama-zumi shrine's museum (*hōseki-kan*) on Omishima in the Inland Sea.

[90] *Taiheiki, maki* 14, "Hakone kassen no koto," p. 394.

[91] Ibid., *maki* 31, "Usui toge kassen no koto," p. 929, for warriors attaching the Ashikaga emblem; see ibid., "Nantei Hachiman ontaishitsu no koto," p. 939, for warriors attaching the Nitta emblem. See also *maki* 14, "Hakone kassen no koto," p. 396, and *maki* 8, "Mayajō kassen no koto," pp. 185–86.

[92] *Taiheiki, maki* 31, "Musashino kassen no koto," p. 920.

Distinguishing friend from foe was no simple matter in an age without uniforms.[93] Family crests constituted the sole marker of identification for many—these crests might be emblazoned on armor, weapons, shields, battle flags, or the sails of ships. By the late Kamakura period, most warriors had taken to using family crests,[94] which were identifiable to nearly all.[95]

At times, family members wearing identical badges but living in different regions allied with opposing forces. They fought against each other with disastrous consequences.[96] According to the chronicles, hundreds might die when such divided families met in battle, until one group, in one instance, improvised by tearing off the right shoulder panel (*sode*) of their armor and attaching it to their helmets.[97] Others devised hybrid crests that combined the motifs of the Ashikaga and Nitta seals with their own.[98] The great increase in family crests during the fourteenth century stems from the tendency of families to divide (and subdivide) their allegiances.[99]

Although some warriors created new crests in order to create distinctions, others used the ambiguity of similar crests to blur their allegiances. For example, the crests of the Ashikaga consisted of a black ring on a white field intersected by two narrow black lines with the center white; the Nitta—who commanded Go-Daigo's imperial armies—had a black circle on a white background intersected by a thick black line. When Ashikaga partisans were defeated, they painted over the white inner circle of the Ashikaga emblem, thereby causing wags in the capital to joke about how these new seals resembled (*nitta*) the Nitta's seal.[100] (See Figure 1.)

Each military unit was identified by a bannerman selected for his bravery.[101] These men proved to be fine targets, and there are many examples of

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[93] For an example of a warrior questioning whether arriving warriors were enemy or ally, see *Taiheiki, maki* 14, "Hakone yosete intai no koto," p. 398. For another example of where enemy were mistakenly assumed to be allies, see *maki* 15, "Miidera kassen no koto," p. 428.

[94] Nuta Raiyū, *Nihon monshōgaku* (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, 1968), p. 32.

[95] For example, Ashikaga Takauji was able to determine who fought for the enemy by inspecting abandoned battle flags. Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron,* pp. 117–18. See also *Taiheiki, maki* 14, "Hakone kassen no koto," pp. 394–95.

[96] Nuta, *Nihon monshōgaku,* p. 36.

[97] Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron,* pp. 88–89.

[98] Nuta, *Nihon monshōgaku,* pp. 1164–65. Six families are known to have combined their crests with the Nitta crest, while at least twelve utilized the Ashikaga crest. The relative paucity of Nitta crests stems from their ultimate defeat.

[99] Ibid., and Satō, *Nanbokuchō no dōran,* p. 189.

[100] *Taiheiki, maki* 15, "Shujō kankō no koto," p. 450.

[101] Imagawa Ryōshun, "Ōsoshi," quoted in Nuta, *Nihon monshōgaku,* p. 36. According to Ryōshun, three types of flags existed: a familial flag, a white flag, and an imperial brocade flag.



Figure 1. The Nitta and Ashikaga Seals

their death or disfigurement in battle.[102] Their banners served to foster a sense of group identity and became invested with considerable emotional value. Indeed, because these warriors fought for honor as much as anything else, they sometimes attacked rashly in order to retrieve a lost flag.[103]

> During the battle on the twenty-seventh, Tomoyuki's retainers [*wakatō*] Nobutsune, Mitsuie, Tanetsune, Ietsuna, and Takada Yasaburō Mitsuyuki again galloped to the fore. To the west of the middle reaches of the Kamo River, they captured three Kurama priests alive. Their deeds were witnessed on the battlefield by the administrator [*samurai dokoro*] Sasaki Bitchū-no-kami.

Reinforcements for Go-Daigo trickled in to the capital as the days passed. Ashikaga Takauji, in his pursuit of Nitta Yoshisada from the east, had neglected to station adequate reserves to his rear. Kitabatake Akie pursued Takauji's army from the north and his arrival in Kyoto therefore tipped the balance against the Ashikaga. Priests from Mt. Hiei and Kurama now poured into the capital but were initially checked by Takauji and his men. The fortunes of battle hung precariously in the balance, as the imperatives of war slowly sucked in increasing numbers of men and women from throughout the archipelago.

As the Kurama prisoners discovered, surrendering and becoming a prisoner were two distinct processes.[104] According to the "law of surrender" (*kōsan no hō*), a warrior was to be subjected to confiscation of half his lands.[105] Or, to be more precise, "according to the set rule, half of the homelands [*honryō*] of those who had surrendered [*kōsannin*] were returned."[106] This "set rule" seems to have been observed more in the breach than in the reality. Powerful warriors rarely suffered such ignominy. Aso Koresumi, distressed by the liberal treatment of his father-in-law, Aso Koretoki, complained "it is a set rule that those who surrender should have only half [their holdings] confirmed. . . . How can [Koretoki] possibly wish for a full confirmation [*ichien ando*]?"[107] Koresumi went so far as to complain about "the set rule, whereas, irrespective of merit [*rihi o ronsezaru*], all those who ally themselves will receive a full confirmation of their current lands."[108] Koretoki was powerful enough to switch sides without any ill effect.[109]

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[102] References to bannermen being killed appear in the following documents: 9.1335 Kamada meyasujō (found under the date 8.18.35 in the DNSR); NBIK 552 and 553; NBIC 1097; Okuno Takahiro, ed., *Kutsuki monjo,* Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1978), Vol. 1, document 232; and Niigata Kenshi Hensan Shitsu, comp., *Niigata kenshi shiryōhen,* Vol. 4 (Niigata: Niigata Prefecture, 1981), document 1051 (7). For wounded bannermen, see KI 32044, 32050, 32080; NBIC 101, 212, 349, 354, 390, 1173; Kanagawa Kenshi Hensanshitsu, comp., *Kanagawa kenshi,* Vol. 3, Part 1 (Yokohama: Kanagawa Kenshi Hensanshitsu, 1975), document 3266; Gunma Kenshi Hensan Iinkai, *Gunma kenshi, shiryōhen,* Vol. 6 *Chūsei,* No. 2) (Gunma: Gunma Prefecture, 1984), document 744; and Shinano Shiryō Kankōkai, comp., *Shinano shiryō,* Vol. 5, pp. 333–34, including one whose head was crushed with a rock and was "half dead." Hyōgo Kenshi Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Hyōgo kenshi,* Vol. 8 (Hyogo: Hyogo Prefecture, 1995), Nanzenji monjo, document 12, p. 26.

[103] *Taiheiki, maki* 7, "Chihayajō kassen no koto," pp. 165–66, and NBIC 375.

How can one account for the difference between warriors who lost half their lands and those who suffered not at all? Timing was crucial. One warrior's comment after another had surrendered in the field proves illuminating.

> I have never heard of such a thing! Norinaga, if you had intended to surrender [lit. become a *kōnin*] you should have done it when the shogun [Takauji] . . . invited you to join his forces with a communiqué [*migyōsho*]! After burning your expressly delivered communiqué, [why did] you come here to surrender? It is too much for words.[110]

In other words, warriors responding to a request to fight could switch sides and suffer no punishment. Those who arrived at an encampment with a request to join allied forces were actually eligible for further rewards.[111] If defeated in battle, however, a warrior handed over his weapons and unstrung his bow, as was the customary practice for surrendering.[112]

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[104] For more on this subject, see Tomikura, ed., *Meitokuki, maki* 2, "Takeda gejō no koto," pp. 99–100.

[105] Satō, *Nanbokuchō no dōran,* p. 181. An instance where a defeated warrior surrendered half his holdings can be found in Fukushima Kenshi Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Fukushima kenshi,* Vol. 7, Kudama monjō, documents 7–8, 3.23.1339 Satake Katsuyoshi Hōgan Gyōkei renshō uchiwatasejō, pp. 211–12.

[106] NBIK 4437 and 5426.

[107] NBIK 3880. The Southern Court promised to confirm only one half of Aso Koretoki's holdings upon his death in 1356, which helps to explain why the Aso sided with the Ashikaga in the 1360s. See NBIK 4437.

[108] NBIK 4281.

[109] NBIK 2651.

[110] Gotō Tanji et al., eds., *Taiheiki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), Vol. 2, *maki* 16, "Bitchū no Fukuyama kassen no koto," pp. 146–47. This passage does not appear in the oldest texts.

[111] KI 32125.

Prisoners were apparently bound and thrown into tiny squalid jails.[113] Those who were incarcerated were among the fortunate because most prisoners were killed outright. During Takauji's initial advance to the east in 1335, prisoners and heads taken in battle were synonymous![114] Some prisoners were immediately executed, while others were killed after a lengthy process of appeal.[115]

More men were killed outright than captured. Only 30 men out of some hundreds were captured alive after the battle of Minatogawa.[116] The *Taiheiki* records instances in which more men were killed than captured alive. In one case, 200 were killed and 100 captured alive, and in another example, 73 killed and 67 captured alive.[117] Those captured might be asked to identify the heads of their less fortunate compatriots.[118] The base (*genin*) were also frequently captured alive due to an apparent reluctance to take the heads of men of lower statuses.[119] Nevertheless, for those of higher status, capture was the equivalent of a humiliating and degrading death, which explains why suicide was, by contrast, a relatively attractive option.

> On the same day, when Yamakawa *hangan* attacked the middle reaches of the Kamo River from the north, [Nobutsune, Mitsuie et al.] again attacked

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[112] For more on the *kōsan no hō,* see *Taiheki, maki* 14, "Shōgun onnyūraku no koto," pp. 417–18. An example of a warrior enticed into surrendering with a promise of further rewards can be found in Iwate-ken Kyōiku Iinkai, *Iwate-ken chūsei monjo,* Vol. 1 (Morioka: Morioka City, 1960), documents 182 and 185, 6.25.1340 and 2.7.1341 Ashikaga Tadayoshi kankōjō, pp. 65–66.

[113] *Taiheiki, maki* 25, "Miyake, Ogino muhon no koto," pp. 745–46. Chancellor Tōin Kinkata briefly describes the process of arrest in his diary. See Iwahashi Kotaya, ed., *Entairyaku,* Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Taiyōsha, 1938), 11.29.1350, p. 374.

[114] *Shizuoka kenshi shiryōhen,* Vol. 6 (*Chūsei,* No. 2), document 81, Ashikaga Takauji Kantō gekō shuku nami kassen chūmon, "Jū-shichi-nichi Hakone kassen," pp. 33–34.

[115] Compare NBIC 1031 with NBIC 331, NBIK 550, and *Taiheiki, maki* 13, "Hyōbu no kyō shinnō kōji," pp. 365–66.

[116] NBIK 617.

[117] For the former, see *Taiheiki, maki* 38, "Miyakata hōki no koto," p. 1133–34; for the latter, see *maki* 34, "Kishū ryūmonsan ikusa no koto," p. 1018.

[118] NBIC 1203; *Taiheiki, maki* 32, "Miyako ikusa no koto," p. 976, and *maki* 38, "Miyakata hōki no koto," p. 1134.

[119] Again, see NBIK 810 and "Hakata nikki," p. 555 for references to a "commoner" (*genin*) and a woman (*bikuni*) being captured alive. Apparently all warriors were killed, for 32 heads and 2 *genin* were brought to Hakata. It is not known if the *genin* were later executed or not. For more on the culture of taking heads, and of some being of too low a status to be identified, see Ikushima Terumi, "Chūsei goki ni okeru 'kirareta kubi' no toriatsukai," *Bunka shigaku,* Vol. 50 (November 1994), pp. 131–50. The wealthy merchant who bankrolled Kusu castle was also captured alive, but his ultimate fate is unknown. NBIK 810.

> the edge of the enemy's shields. The horse Nobutsune was riding was shot with an arrow. Yamakawa *hangan* and his followers saw this.

From this passage, one can see that warriors might mass behind a barricade of shields. Safely ensconced in favorable terrain, they frightened enemy horses who refused to directly charge. Skilled horsemen compensated by harrying the fringes of such a force, although this was a risky endeavor as Nobutsune discovered to his chagrin. Nevertheless, Nobutsune was relatively lucky. Although he had undoubtedly been unhorsed by his plunging mount, he was apparently unscathed. His mount also survived, for horse deaths involved considerable financial loss and were therefore invariably recorded in petitions.

> On the battle of the thirtieth, in front of the west gate of Hōjūji, Tomoyuki's man [*rōtō*] Sugimoto Yōichi Yoshihiro grappled with Seki Magogorō, a houseman [*kenin*] of Ōta *hangan,* and took his head. This was seen [and inspected] by Sasaki Bitchū-no-kami, the battle administrator.

The Ashikaga's position in the capital was becoming untenable. During the waning days of the first month of 1336, they were overwhelmed by the Kitabatake's reinforcements, suffered severe casualties, and fled. Two of those mentioned in this narrative—Uesugi Norifusa and Miura Inaba-no-kami—died on the twenty-seventh at the edge of the Kamo River, while another, Yamanouchi Michitsugu, who had unleashed his arrows so accurately at the bridge near Iwashimizu, died on the thirtieth.

What was it like to grapple with an enemy? One might use a "bear claw" (which resembles a giant rake) to unhorse a fleeing opponent, who would presumably be cut up by foot soldiers following close behind. Otherwise, one might circle behind an opponent, overtake him, and stab him in the throat from behind.[120] These deeds were rarely recorded, although blows from behind were common enough to lead to an improvement in the rear portion of Japanese helmets.[121]

The act of grappling required considerable horsemanship, for Japanese war ponies were ponderous beasts that could only gallop for a short distance. First the warrior had to trot within striking distance, then spur on his mount and overtake and unhorse his fleeing opponent with either a long sword or a "bear claw"—a rather perilous act, for horses, skittish creatures, were easily startled by an enemy's sword or the shadow of its rider's blade.[122] Those who preferred projectiles would slow their horses to a trot in order to unleash a volley of arrows.[123]

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[120] Depictions of stabbing from the rear commonly appear in fourteenth-century picture scrolls. See for example "Shōtōku taishi eden," in *Ibaragi no emaki,* p. 2, and *Go-sannen kassen ekotoba.*

[121] Helmet liners increased in sophistication as well in order to prevent the wearer from being knocked senseless after being pummeled. Lecture, Takahashi Masaaki, Kyōto University, October 11, 1996.

> On the first day of the second month, Tomoyuki traveled together with the shogun from Shinomura in Tanba to Hyōgo Island in Harima. During that battle of Nishinomiya in Settsu [Province], [Tomoyuki] served under the command of Sama-no-kami [Ashikaga Tadayoshi]. When [Tadayoshi] ascended the mountain, [Tomoyuki] performed military service. The particulars were witnessed by Ōtaka Iyo-no-kami.
>
> On the eleventh, at the battle of the Tejima riverbed in Settsu, just as [Tomoyuki] encamped at the river's edge, [Ashikaga Takauji] suddenly returned to Hyōgo. That night [Tomoyuki and his men were] summoned and followed.

Ashikaga Takauji, in defeat, fled the capital and sought refuge at Shinomura, to the west. It was here, where his mother held extensive lands, that he had first raised his flag of rebellion against Kamakura two and a half years before; and it was here that he reflected upon the precipitous reversal of his fortunes.[124] With the battle for the capital now lost, the indomitable Takauji regrouped and set off for the south, where his troops were once again hammered at Nishinomiya. They fled to the bustling port at Hyōgo Island in order to avert annihilation.

> On the twelfth, Sama-no-kami (Tadayoshi) departed from Mana castle at Hyōgo. Tomoyuki was about to follow with him, but then saw a notice that said that all had been killed. [Tomoyuki] believed this; and then suddenly under the cover of darkness, the [Ashikaga] boats departed; Tomoyuki did not know of this. Not being able to follow [the Ashikaga in battle, Tomoyuki] lost his will [*hon'i*]. Although it might seem to resemble the epitome of disservice, particularly when considering that relatives resided in the west, Tomoyuki nevertheless did not know the lay of the land. The enemy was in full pursuit. Having no other recourse, Tomoyuki crept into the capital and fled eastward on the thirtieth. At Mikawa [Province], a number of skirmishers [*nobushi*] repeatedly tried to take Tomoyuki's life. Any particular queries can be answered by Kō Gorō Hyōe-no-jō and Kō Mimasaka Tarō, etc. Tomoyuki eventually arrived at Ihara castle in Tōtōmi [Province] and, after the enemy fled, took his leave and departed for the east [the Kanto].

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[122] See *Taiheiki, maki* 15, "Tadarahama ikusa no koto," p. 458, and *maki* 29, "Moronao shatei yoriki shōgai no koto," p. 883.

[123] Lecture given by Kondō Yoshikazu at the September 17, 1996, meeting of the Nihonshi Kenkyūkai in Kyoto.

[124] Kameoka-shi Bunka Shiryōkan, comp., *Nanbokuchō jidai no Tanba Kameoka* (Kameoka: Kameoka City, 1993), pp. 1–2.

Poor Tomoyuki was left behind in the chaos of the Ashikaga defeat. He decided to return to his homelands, a recourse adopted by other Ashikaga partisans, such as Kutsuki Yoshiuji, as well.[125] Others, old and feeble, "remained hidden in the capital." [126] Remarkably few warriors surrendered to Nitta Yoshisada or Go-Daigo.[127] Most fled to where their power was strongest in order to observe what punishments might be meted out to Ashikaga supporters. The fact that these men did not readily join Go-Daigo's resurgent allies reveals the depth of mistrust and dissatisfaction that many felt for his regime. A few doughty warriors continued open hostilities in spite of the fact that their cause appeared hopeless. The indefatigable Hatano Kageuji would later boast that:

> when the shogun [Ashikaga Takauji] departed for Hyōgo Island, the victorious enemy surrounded my castle. I wanted to join the shogun's forces, but could not. I thought I would die where I stood. I had all but resolved to kill myself in the garden any number of times, but somehow I managed to preserve my unworthy life. If one were to carefully consider the extent of my service [*chūkin*], then it would be the equivalent of dying in battle. After all, most merely ran away.[128]

Takauji likewise continued to struggle. He commandeered some 300 boats and set off for Kyushu. Although there was a good deal of confusion as his large forces attempted to board an insufficient number of boats, Takauji was still able to issue mobilization orders on the thirteenth, the day he actually departed from the port of Hyōgo Island.[129] Two days later, Takauji received an imperial edict from the retired Northern Court emperor Kōgon and thus secured the legitimation necessary to rebound from his defeat. He immediately issued a flurry of confirmations to dissatisfied warriors, ordered warriors to guard the sea lanes of the Inland Sea, and granted lands to important temples.[130] By the seventeenth, he had decided before arriving there to stay at Akamaseki, which was the port near the straits that separated Honshu from Kyushu.[131] A day later (and only five days after Takauji had actually fled the capital), a number of Kyushu warriors now began to align themselves with his movement.[132] While marching westward, he protected his back by dispatching collaterals to mobilize forces in areas he had passed through.[133] On the twentieth, he arrived at his destination of Akamaseki.[134]

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[125] Okuno, ed., *Kutsuki monjo,* Vol. 2, document 428, 1.28.1336 Kutsuki Yoshiuji gunchūjō. No Kutsuki exploits are mentioned after Yoshiuji arrived at Hyōgo island, so one can only assume that he returned to his homeland after the Ashikaga fled to Kyushu.

[126] NBIK 905–6.

[127] Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron,* pp. 96, 117–18.

[128] NBIC 259. The greatest service one could perform was to die in battle. As death merited the most compensation—understandably—Hatano Kageuji is clearly stating that his merit was of the first order.

[129] For the details of Takauji's arrival at Hyōgo island, see Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron,* pp. 94–98.

[130] NBIC 247–51, documents dating from 2.15.1336 until 2.18.1336, and NBIK 417.

[131] For a mobilization order to a local warrior, see NBIK 418, of 2.17.1336.

Rapid communication more than compensated for the institutional instability of the Ashikaga forces. One by one, groups of warriors arrived at Akamaseki.[135] Save for a core of Ashikaga generals and a few Kyushu warriors, most of those who joined with the Ashikaga had not previously fought in the capital.[136] These warriors mobilized with stunning speed. Takauji's first calls to arms to western warriors are dated on the thirteenth, and yet, six days later, the first Kyushu warriors were joining his forces before he even reached Akamaseki![137] Within a week, warriors from Awa Province arrived, and within a further three days, warriors from as far afield as Hizen, Aki, and Satsuma reported as well.[138]

A well-developed relay system ensured the rapid transmission of messages. We find numerous references to "express ponies" and indeed even to "fast boats" transmitting information.[139] During the second month, however, various lines of communication were effectively cut in the east and west. Ashikaga partisans in the east, such as Soma Mitsutane, were left in the dark and were vulnerable to "the enemy spreading many lies." [140] Conversely, Go-Daigo's partisans knew nothing of Takauji's whereabouts or the political situation in the west.[141] Go-Daigo even dispatched words of praise to the Daigūji of Aso shrine some 22 days after his death at the battle of Tadarahama![142]

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[132] NBIK 419.

[133] NBIC 254—in this case, the Imagawa to Izumo. Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron* provides a detailed account of the provinces to which a number of supporters were dispatched on pp. 97–98.

[134] Yashiro and Kami, eds., *Baishōron,* p. 98.

[135] For documents concerning the arrival of these warriors to Akamaseki, see NBIK 420, 422, 439, 445, and 1111.

[136] See NBIK 756 and 905 for the exploits of Sebama Masanao and Shiga Yorifusa, two Kyushu warriors who traveled with Takauji from the east to Kyoto and then to Kyushu.

[137] NBIK 419.

[138] Indeed, the Miike of Aki (who also had holdings in Chikugo Province) were first requested on the seventeenth day of the second month to go to Akamaseki, and they arrived exactly ten days later. See NBIK 418, 445.

[139] See "Hakata nikki," pp. 552–54, for the former, and Amino, *Nihon chūsei shiryō no kadai,* Oyama ke monjo, document 8, 7.17 Taishōgun bō migyōsho, p. 295, for the latter.

[140] Toyoda and Tashiro, eds., *Soma monjo,* document 27, 2.18.1336 Soma Shigetane sadamegaki, pp. 22–23. Soma Mitsutane lamented that "I have heard that Shigetane has killed himself in Kamakura. Furthermore, since his elder brother Chikatane went to the capital, I have heard nothing concerning his whereabouts." Ibid., document 34, 5.20.1336 Soma Mitsutane yuzurijō, pp. 29–30.

[141] Nitta Yoshisada only began searching for the fleeing Ashikaga on the nineteenth of the second month—the day before Takauji and his army had arrived at Akamaseki. NBIC 253.

Nomoto Tomoyuki clearly knew little about the whereabouts or ultimate fate of Takauji. Although there were some orders written on tiny pieces of paper or penned on silk so that they might be hidden in the top-knot of a messenger,[143] Nomoto Tomoyuki was not important enough to have received such a secret message. Instead, he made his way east to the best of his abilities.

> The battle of Oyama castle. After the shogun departed for the west, an uprising by the forces of Kitabatake Akiie caused the people to be unsettled. All those allied [to the shogun] arrived at the encampment near this castle. Those of this family who were of such a mind headed toward [Oyama's] castle, where they performed continuous military service for many days. On the third day of the eleventh month of 1336, during the battle of Yokotamohara, [Tomoyuki?] took [*buntori*] one head, which was seen by the commanding general. In addition, his man [*rōtō*] Ōbuchi Hikokurō Nyūdō was wounded, which was recorded in Tomoyuki's report of arrival. This sequence of events was witnessed by the members of this family. Both the commanding general and the grandmother of Oyama Tsune-inumaru monogrammed this document. [Tomoyuki] also received a document of arrival from Momonoi Suruga-no-kami [Naotsune].
>
> On the tenth day of the third month of this year (1337), Oda Kunai-gon-no-taiyū and Masado Tora Hosshimaru led substantial rebel forces toward the Hitachi provincial headquarters. Tomoyuki's representative [*daikan*] Iwase Hikotarō Nobutsune cut down one enemy horseman. Masado Hitachi-no-suke Hiromasa rode forth and received notice for his deeds. The approved petition for reward, signed by Satake Gyōbu-no-taiyū, makes this clear.

The confusion and uncertainty that pervades the tumultuous year of 1336 permeates Tomoyuki's petition. Kitabatake Akiie, after dislodging Takauji from the capital with his northern army, returned to pacify the east. This proved to be a strategic blunder, for Takauji was able to regroup in Kyushu to the west and to retake the capital during the fifth month of 1336. Tomoyuki's actions during these decisive few months are unknown—perhaps he hid himself and waited for a more favorable time to counterattack.

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[142] For the order, see NBIK 497, 514; for his death, see NBIK 1182.

[143] One such document, of 4.29.1333 and dispatched to Aso Koretoki, is reproduced between pp. 142 and 143 in Tōkyō Teikoku Daigaku Shiryōsanjo, *Dai Nihon komonjo iewake 13, Aso ke monjo,* Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Teikoku Daigaku Shuppankai, 1932–34). See also the Shimazu document of 4.29 (1333), a reproduction which appears on p. 37 of Satō Kazuhiko's *Zusetsu Taiheiki no jidai* (Tokyo: Kawadashobō Shinsha, 1990). A reference to such a method of transmission appears in *Taiheiki, maki* 18, "Urufu hangan hata o ageru koto," p. 558. For more on such documents, see Matsui Teruaki, "Origami no chakutōjō ni tsuite," *Komonjo kenkyū,* No. 34 (May 1991), pp. 2–38.

By the eleventh month, Tomoyuki was again active, although his movement was confined to Shimōsa Province in the east, where both Oyama castle and his homelands were located.[144] Ashikaga supporters in eastern Japan were on the defensive and remained holed up in the fortified dwellings of the Oyama. Since the head of the Oyama family was an infant, the boy's grandmother took an active role in leading the house, even to the extent of placing her monogram on warriors' petitions for reward.

Southern Court forces dominated the east early in 1337. In the battle for Seki castle, in Hitachi Province, Shintsuma Matajirō Taneshige, Nomoto Gorō Takanobu, and four of his retainers were killed on 7.8.1337. The battle then spread to Shimōsa's Taga district (*gō*) in Kanzaki-no-shō, where the representatives (*daikan*) of Tomoyuki burned the Nomoto residences while Nomoto wives and children hid in the forests in order to avoid the forces of Kitabatake Akii and the Oda. These *daikan* probably included Iwase Nobutsune, who performed valorous acts on 3.10.1337. Their fate is unclear. As for Nomoto Tomoyuki himself, he died on 3.27.1337. It is not known whether he died in battle or peacefully, although the wording "he departed for the other world," as opposed to his being killed (*uchishi*), suggests that he might not have died violently. Still, the days of peace that Tomoyuki had waited for prior to submitting his petition did not arrive in his lifetime. It seems unlikely that Tomoyuki ever knew that the regime that he had fought and died for would ultimately triumph and come to dominate Japan's political landscape for two and a half centuries.

Nomoto's son, Tsurujūmaru, succeeded him but was unable to travel to the capital to submit his petition for reward until later. In the meantime, he and his retainers were busy seeking just to survive the Kitabatake onslaught.

Not that death was a matter for great fear, because to die gloriously in battle meant that one's descendants would receive great rewards. Thus Hitomi On'a offered sentiments such as: "I think I shall die ahead of others and leave a name for the men of a later day." [145] Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki also wrote to his son and told of how his actions had been praised: "Don't worry if I die in battle, for the general and members of the unit [will take care of you]." [146] One oath penned by the members of the Kadochigai *ikki* expressly states: "if any member of this group [*shūchū*] is killed or dies of illness, the upbringing of his orphans will be provided for. If someone attempts to seize [an orphan's] holdings on the pretext that he is a minor, the members of this unit will come to his aid." [147] And indeed, Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki's final thoughts seem to be for his family's welfare: "I do not believe I shall return from this battle alive. My only regret is that there is not one [retainer] left [to take care of things back home]." [148] Nomoto Tomoyuki's worries must have been the same but, unlike Tsuneyuki, he still had loyal retainers fighting for the welfare of his son.

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[144] Nomoto Tomoyuki's homelands, Kanzaki-no-shō, were located in Shimosa Province's Taga district, where the Chiba and Southern Court supporters fought a battle. NBIC 654.

[145] *Taiheiki,* maki 6, "Akasakajō kassen no koto," pp. 148–49, and McCullough, trans., *The Taiheiki,* p. 166. The Hitomi episode is not a *Taiheiki* fabrication. See the "Kusunoki kassen chūmon" of 2.22.1333, in *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū shidenbu.*

[146] Hino Shishi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Hino shishi shiryōshū, Takahata Fudō tainai monjo hen,* document 45, Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki shojō.

Here the petition ends its narrative of Tomoyuki's exploits. The Nomoto must have felt the strain of prolonged warfare which was exacerbated with Tomoyuki's untimely death. Nomoto Tsurujūmaru ended his account by boasting of his undivided service (*muni chūsetsu*) for the Ashikaga, thereby suggesting his belief, widely shared at the time, that death in battle deserved compensation in the form of land rights, such as *jitō shiki*. [149] Confirmations of existing lands, or rewards of new holdings, were cherished above all else because land rights had been destabilized with the outbreak of civil war.

All lands could be declared "appropriable" (*kessho*) by those aiding a competing political entity. Commanders, either generals (*taishō*) or constables (*shugo*), attempted to attract the most powerful warriors to their cause because these men could attain, through force if necessary, those the *taishō* or *shugo* promised them. As for those who were relatively weak, their lands were generally destined to become "appropriable." Hence, those wishing to maintain (or expand) their holdings increasingly needed to secure a protector.

Tomoyuki's brief abandonment of the Ashikaga cause early in 1336 did not preclude his son from requesting compensation in a manner acceptable to a commander, of unknown origins, in 1338. Others received substantial rewards for transferring their allegiances at this time. In 1343, for example, the Southern Court stalwart Yūki Chikatomo joined the Ashikaga after receiving the enticing offer from Takauji that "there shall be no disturbances regarding holdings [*chigyō*] [awarded] before Kenmu 2 [1335]." [150] Yuki Chikatomo was assured of adequate compensation because he had been the linchpin of the Southern Court's defenses in eastern Japan. In contrast to Chikatomo, whose defection crippled the Southern Court's resistance in the east, Tomoyuki accomplished nothing of strategic consequence. Accordingly, Tsurujūmaru only managed to be recognized by a lesser commander who affixed his pedestrian monogram to this petition.

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147. NBIK 6848.

148. Hino Shishi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Hino shishi shiryōshū, Takahata Fudō tainai monjo hen,* document 50, Yamanouchi Tsuneyuki shojō.

149. Descendants of warriors who had been killed would write of their fathers' "loyal service" of being cut down in battle (*uchishi chūkin*). NBIK 6294–95. Some fathers who lost their sons could receive praise and *jitō shiki* for their sons' *chūsetsu.* NBIK 5776–77.

150. DNSR, Series 6, Vol. 7, of 2.25.1343, p. 573. This was reconfirmed on 2.27.1351. See DNSR, Series 6, Vol. 14.

As no other documents survive, it is impossible to ascertain whether Tsurujūmaru received rewards for Tomoyuki's battle service. Whether Tsurujūmaru was able to maintain his holdings with the help of Iwase Nobutsune is also unclear, though the paucity of later records pertaining to the Nomoto suggests that he may have been ultimately unsuccessful. Only this single trace survives of these men and the drama of their lives, rolled in a scroll containing Kumagai house documents. And yet if Nomoto Tomoyuki, Iwase Nobutsune, and the others could but know that their exploits are remembered in some small way after 660 years, I suspect that they would not be displeased.

Conclusion

How important were the wars of the fourteenth century? When viewed quantitatively, the scale of battle appears to have been small. During 1336, one can trace the activities of over 1,600 men, but for most years, fewer than 200 can be verified as actively fighting. Likewise, on average, only six or seven warriors are mentioned in each document. Nevertheless, the impact of war was greater than these aggregate numbers would imply. War was fought throughout the land by warriors from every province, from Mutsu to the north to Satsuma in the south. The war was general and endemic—at least 235 days of serious fighting can be traced during 1336 alone.[151] Every region experienced fighting, and so even those who attempted to remain aloof from the fray were affected by war levies and disruptions in trade.

A myriad of aggregate decisions propelled the singular process of war along a course that none could foresee. Men such as Nomoto Tomoyuki chose to fight and risk death in support of one political entity, the Ashikaga regime, with the hope of preserving their status and alienating their lands as they saw fit. Tomoyuki fought for enrichment to be sure, but his refusal to surrender to the forces of Go-Daigo in the winter of 1336, when all seemed lost for the Ashikaga, points to a sea change in attitudes. Central authority no longer attracted unquestioned obedience, nor was it capable of bringing overwhelming force to bear in disputes. Authority could no longer be commanded. Instead, it had to be enforced.

Political power ultimately accrued to those able to wield the most formidable fighting forces, which in turn depended upon their ability to link economic surpluses to the waging of war. The systemic burdens of supplying an army caused the *bakufu,* controlled by Ashikaga Takauji, to pass a far-reaching law in 1352 that authorized *shugo* (provincial constables), to earmark half of a province's revenue for military provisions (*hanzei*), thereby linking the machinery of tax collection to the procurement of provisions. The costs of war eroded the autonomy of men like the Nomoto who increasingly were no longer able to fight as they chose. Some became retainers of the *shugo* and took advantage of their lord's newfound powers, while others tried to remain independent, although these men suffered accordingly. Tsuchiya Muneyoshi, for example, chose to fight for the Yamana and not the local *shugo* in 1391. His lands were declared "appropriable" by the *shugo*'s retainers *(hikannin)*. In 1398, Muneyoshi appealed to the *shugo,* boasted of his considerable military service, and asked that his lands be restored.[152] His wish was apparently granted, for five years later he passed his *jitō shiki* to his son, with the caveat that the *shugo* shall "exercise authority [*onsata*] over these lands in the matter of 'public' military affairs [*onkuji gunyaku*]." [153] Muneyoshi managed to maintain his holdings only after sacrificing his autonomy. His son Shinsaburō Kiyotō, bound to fight for the *shugo,* had even less freedom to choose his military allegiances. The prohibitive expenses of war forced most warriors to abandon their cherished autonomy.

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[151] Each month only witnessed, on average, slightly under nine days of peace. The first and eighth months only had four calm days, while the eleventh month witnessed 17 days.

Few proved capable of resisting the tidal forces of fourteenth-century war. The imperatives of war proved so compelling that warriors continued to fight for its successful completion at the expense of all other considerations. Men such as Tomoyuki defended their rights through force and yet, ironically, their very use of force ensured that their autonomy would be subsumed into the structures of regional political authority. War, once unleashed, carved new channels that endured long after Nomoto Tomoyuki's life dissipated into obscurity.

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[152] Hirakata Shishi Hensan Iinkai, comp., *Hirakata shishi 6, shiryōhen,* Vol. 1 (Hirakata: Hirakata City, 1969), Tsuchiya-shi monjo, document 32, 4.1398 Tsuchiya Muneyoshi meyasu an, p. 230.

[153] Ibid., Tsuchiya-shi monjo, document 33, 6.15.1403 Tsuchiya Muneyoshi yuzurijō, p. 230.